Our further reading into the techniques and figures of argumentation moves us deeper into what the rhetor does during the process of invention, the discovering of all available means of persuasion in a given case. If the proof or evidence (logos) is scientifically certain (called “inartistic”), then it’s a matter for logic: the issue is irrefutable or indisputable, the information is not in need of interpretation. However, if the truth of the evidence is not certain, not irrefutable, but in fact arguable, then it’s a matter for rhetoric: it is information in need of interpretation, which means a plausible perspective must be developed, which means necessarily that it can be refuted. These are known as “artistic” proofs. We can begin to see why rhetoric applies so well to documentary film and writing, and also why rhetoric gave Plato the idealist such concerns. “Artistic” suggests that understanding of the truth is shaped (fabricated, made) by human hands and minds.
We have read about Stasis and can apply the 4 questions to Central Park Five as a key element of invention: for the prosecutor’s in the case, for Burns in re-presenting the case, and ultimately for us in analyzing Burns’ case (your first writing project).
We can also call upon the knowledge of Logical Fallacies. One of the ways to understand the rhetorical power–but at the same time, the rhetorical problem–of these techniques is to recognize that many of them can also be viewed as logical fallacies, depending on how they are used. We are decidedly in the messy, murky, and manipulative rhetorical realm of the human world when using and identifying these techniques, not in the pure, ideal realm of logic (Plato pointing up above). Argumentum ad Populum (arguing from popular opinion) is both a figure of address and an informal logical fallacy.
In other words, these rhetorical techniques of argumentation are tools for developing an enthymeme, not for the logical syllogism. In fact, we might think of a logical fallacy as a rhetorical technique that in some way is disguising itself as a logical syllogism. To be more specific: there are two types of fallacies or invalid ways of arguing. Formal fallacies, in which the logic rules of the syllogism are violated (the realm of philosophy and scientific evidence). And there are informal fallacies, the realm of rhetoric, where the problem is not with validity as much as relevance. A number of fallacies known by various names could be grouped under this mistake in reasoning: making sweeping generalization, or making a general conclusion about a more specific example or class without qualification. For example: false cause, or anecdotal, or the genetic fallacy. The Fallacy Files provides a related example known as secundum quid, when qualifications are ignored:
Form:
Xs are normally Ys.
A is an X. (Where A is abnormal.)
Therefore, A is a Y.Example:
Birds normally can fly.
Tweety the Penguin is a bird.
Therefore, Tweety can fly.
Or there is the fallacy of false causation known by the Latin phrase Post hoc ergo propter hoc (Latin: “after this, therefore because of this”), an informal fallacy that states: “Since event Y followed event X, event Y must have been caused by event X.” It is often shortened simply to post hoc fallacy. Do we see secundum quid or the post hoc fallacy at work in the Central Park Five case?
These fallacies operate through a break-down in reasoning (logos)–that’s why they are known as logical fallacies. But as informal fallacies, we are really talking about rhetoric more than logic. We are in the world of probability and plausible and qualified perspectives (Some Xs are Ys, in certain cases), not in the pure world of logic and universal certainty (All Xs are Ys). Identifying it as a fallacy doesn’t prevent its use, since the use of the fallacy can be–as I think we see in the case of the Central Park Five–rhetorically effective and powerful. However, a better grasp of the rhetorical problem of generalization gives us greater power for our rhetorical analysis. We can better see and critique what is going on. We can call foul, argue that it is a generalization that does not offer proper qualification.
Burns demonstrates that such rhetorical knowledge does not always win out in the rough world of politics and the tabloid press, where narratives based on preconceptions are quickly formed and then hard to revise. In this way, the police/prosecution/press are not guilty of injustice, in the scientific or legal or formal, logical senses of invalid argument. They use rhetorical tools of persuasion and narrative and invention that are available to them. The fallacy of their argument is informal, rhetorical: it is a problem of relevance.
Burns shows us that this rhetorical knowledge also matters in the world of documentary. In countering the rhetoric used by the police and media, she re-presents an argument that she contends is more relevant to the case and its complexities. Are you persuaded by the fallacies she illuminates? In what way does the film and its available means of representation (image, sound, voice, etc.) aid Burns in this illumination? Which scenes or moments stand out?
Further Reading:
For a decent review of the syllogism vs. the enthymeme–and our larger discussion of logic vs. rhetoric, check out this AI-generated Google response. It’s also a good time, as we head toward the first writing project, to read through my guidelines and expectations for properly attributing AI tools if you use them as a resource or a source (in the syllabus under Academic Integrity).
You can further explore the world of logical fallacies at the Taxonomy of Logical Fallacies.
A more reader friendly listing of numerous informal fallacies can be found at My Logical Fallacies. What other fallacies do you see at work in the argumentation supporting the case against the Central Park Five. Is Burns guilty of any fallacies of her own, particularly in her refutation of the case? For example, in her refutation of the police, does she simply turn the accusations against the accusers, known as Tu Quoque, a form of argumentum ad hominem?
Since rhetoric combines reasoning with language and words, one very basic and important method of rhetorical analysis is always to think about the roots of the words we use. In other words, etymology–with a resource like the OED or the Etymology Online [both linked under our Resources on the right side of Available Means]. For example:
fallacy (n.)
late 15c., “deception, false statement,” from Latin fallacia “deception, deceit, trick, artifice,” abstract noun from fallax (genitive fallacis) “deceptive,” from fallere “deceive” (see fail (v.)). Specific sense in logic, “false syllogism, invalid argumentation,” dates from 1550s. An earlier form was fallace (c. 1300), from Old French fallace. argument (n.)
early 14c., “statements and reasoning in support of a proposition or causing belief in a doubtful matter,” from Old French arguement “reasoning, opinion; accusation, charge” (13c.), from Latin argumentum “a logical argument; evidence, ground, support, proof,” from arguere “make clear, make known, prove” (see argue). Sense passed through “subject of contention” (1590s) to “a quarrel” (by 1911), a sense formerly attached to argumentation.
We could also think of a fallacy as a problem when reasoning becomes unbalanced, out of whack. Analogy is a figure of reasoning by comparison and proportion. It emerges from mathematical logic and Plato, but makes its way to rhetoric.
analogy (n.)
early 15c., “correspondence, proportion,” from Old French analogie or directly from Latin analogia, from Greek analogia “proportion,” from ana “upon, according to” (see ana-) + logos “ratio,” also “word, speech, reckoning” (from PIE root *leg- (1) “to collect, gather,” with derivatives meaning “to speak, to ‘pick out words'”).
A Greek mathematical term given a wider sense by Plato. The meaning “partial agreement, likeness or proportion between things” is from 1540s. In logic, “an argument from the similarity of things in some ways inferring their similarity in others,” c. 1600.
also from early 15c.
Available Means 