Sarah Burns – Available Means

Logic (or dialectics, philosophy) is the fist, rhetoric is the open hand. Both are ways of pursuing arguments. What’s the difference? Leith says the difference is a matter of persuasion (rhetoric’s version of logos, likely and probable evidence or proof) as opposed to the kind of “proof absolute” associated with formal logic used in math and science, and valued by philosophical logic (60). Leith points to the importance of Aristotle in establishing this understanding of rhetoric’s emphasis on persuasion as opposed to certainty.

In part 2 of his Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies three modes of persuasion, known to us still by the Greek words ethos, pathos, and logos. Here is Aristotle:

Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts-sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.

Leith reminds us that many of the categories and divisions rhetoric has us think about are “fuzzy art” since they “overlap and interpenetrate” (43). That applies certainly to these three appeals: structures for thinking about 3 core elements necessary for a persuasive composition, different but related: ethos can blend with pathos and also relate to logos. But it also helps to get a better grasp of each of these aspects.

Aristotle goes further in focusing on logos (and its somewhat fuzzy relation to, and difference from mathematical or philosophical logic, also called dialectics) by distinguishing artistic and inartistic evidence or proof. The kind of evidence used in rhetorical persuasion is most often artistic–crafted by hand. Inartistic evidence is given and certain. Think of a mathematical proof or scientific formula. This is where the difference between the “syllogism” and the “enthymeme” comes forward.

Syllogism vs. Enthymeme:

As Leith explains in his discussion of “Invention,” Aristotle’s rhetorical “logos” means evidence that the rhetorician presents for proof, but proof which is plausible, not absolute or certain. In the context of judicial rhetoric, as Leith explains, we still identify this rhetorical proof with the phrase “reasonable doubt.” Aristotle’s logos is related to, but different than (a wayward cousin Leith calls it) the philosophical logic of Plato. This difference between rhetoric and logic can be understood further in the difference between the syllogism and the enthymeme (two of our keywords). In Part 1 of his treatise on Rhetoric, Aristotle describes syllogism as the primary technique of philosophical logic or “dialectic,” while the enthymeme is a primary technique of rhetoric. The key difference we see concerns truth viewed as a certainty vs. truth viewed as a probability, what is “approximately true.”

And further on in Part 2, he defines the enthymeme as a “rhetorical syllogism,” by this asserting that it is an argument that has logic, but deals with probabilities and contingencies, and can be refuted–whereas the pure logic of the syllogism is irrefutable and absolute. The logic of the syllogism or philosophical dialectic (the kind that Plato valued exclusively) leads to truth that is already established. The evidence of the rhetorical syllogism, however, in dealing with the human world of actions and behavior, leads the audience to a decision that is persuasive, but has “alternative possibilities.” The premise is assumed (or half-assed, as Leith puts it), not certain or established, not axiomatic (irrefutable). Think of the way Nichols describes the truth of documentary film: a framework for a plausible perspective; information in need of interpretation. Dialectic and logic, at least as Plato conceived it (the fist), deals with information; rhetoric, as Aristotle conceived it is the open hand, shaping and framing the information because it is in need of interpretation.

Syllogism (scientific/mathematical/philosophical logic)

All X = Y

Z also = X

Therefore Z must = Y

Enthymeme or Thesis or more simply Argument

[Some X = Y]

Z = X

Therefore Z most likely or probably = Y

The etymology of the word “enthymeme” suggests that it entails the reasoning or argumentation that is necessary in an imperfect , shadowy world of dust and smoke, rather than the perfect world of pure logic.

“a syllogism in which one premise is omitted,” in Aristotle, “an inference from likelihoods and signs,” 1580s, from Latin enthymema, from Greek enthymema “thought, argument, piece of reasoning,” from enthymesthai “to think, consider,” literally “to keep in mind, take to heart,” from en “in” (see en- (2)) + thymos “spirit, courage, anger, sense” (from PIE root *dheu- (1) “dust, vapor, smoke”)

Here is a useful, further discussion of the sort of mathematical/axiomatic/scientific logic of the syllogism that Aristotle develops in his other work–in contrast with the rhetorical syllogism he discusses in Rhetoric, where the concern is not validity but relevance and probability. From a recent essay, “How Aristotle Created the Computer”:

Aristotle’s central observation was that arguments were valid or not based on their logical structure, independent of the non-logical words involved. The most famous argument schema he discussed is known as the syllogism:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

You can replace “Socrates” with any other object, and “mortal” with any other predicate, and the argument remains valid. The validity of the argument is determined solely by the logical structure. The logical words — “all,” “is,” are,” and “therefore” — are doing all the work.

Aristotle also defined a set of basic axioms from which he derived the rest of his logical system:

An object is what it is (Law of Identity)

No statement can be both true and false (Law of Non-contradiction)

Every statement is either true or false (Law of the Excluded Middle)

These axioms weren’t meant to describe how people actually think (that would be the realm of psychology), but how an idealized, perfectly rational person ought to think.

Aristotle’s axiomatic method influenced an even more famous book, Euclid’s Elements, which is estimated to be second only to the Bible in the number of editions printed.

Why then do we need rhetoric? Because humans aren’t computers, aren’t perfectly rational; the world isn’t ideal.

When researching (or discovering, inventing) an argument for rhetorical persuasion (not philosophical logic), Aristotle identifies various “topics” or commonplaces that can serve as a model. You read more about these in the “Judicial Rhetoric” chapter in Leith, and will return to this as we go further into Central Park Five and the case. Here is a useful listing of all the topics provided by Silva Rhetoricae.

With Aristotle and the rhetorical concept of invention in mind, what can we say–from our emerging rhetorical perspective–about the proof that the police/prosecutors/media produce in the case, and the means that are available to them to produce the truth of their case? What can we say about the proof that Sarah Burns uses and represents in her response? What means are available to her?

Tag: Sarah Burns

The Rhetoric of Invention: plausible perspectives